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The Wye Conference was one of a series of meetings on 
rural finance that The Ohio State University, with support 
from the Agency for International Development, has recently 
held in various countries. The meetings have been prompted 
by the increasing attention given to credit programs aimed 
at stimulating agricultural production and helping the 
rural poor in low income countries. The popularity of 
~ these credit activities is due, in part, to the ease with 
which most of them can be carried out. For the political 
leader it is easy to announce a new credit program or to in-
crease the amount of funds available for lending in response 
to some pressing problems in rural areas; a credit response 
allows the government to show an immediate concern for prob-
lems. Other reasons for the popularity of credit programs 
are traditional feelings that informal credit markets are 
working poorly, that many farmers have a desparate need for 
additional loans, and that most farmers will not adopt pro-
fitable new technology unless they have access to formal 
loans. Many of these traditional feelings about rural finan-
cial markets were challenged by papers and discussions in 
the Conference. 
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The topics covered in the Conference fell into three 
general groups: policy issues that affect the overall per-
formance of rural financial markets, problems faced by the 
financial intermediary, and financial problems in farm 
households. 
Policy Issues 
Three Conference papers focused on how national policies 
affect the performance of rural financial markets [Adams, 
Giorgis, and Graham and Bourne]. I argued that many of 
the agricultural credit programs around the world were not 
working well and that the overall performance of rural 
financial markets was unsatisfactory. This is due to incor-
rect policies based on faulty assumptions. Concessionary 
interest rate policies and the failure to use formal rural 
financial markets to mobilize voluntary financial savings 
were two of the points I emphasized. 
The papers on Ethiopia and Jamaica illustrated some of 
the common problems that persist in rural financial markets 
in low income countries. Ethiopia is typical of many 
African countries that have relatively small formal finan-
cial systems and few formal rural financial institutions. 
In cour1tries like Ethiopia, building and strengthening the 
financial institutions that provide financial services must 
receive a good deal of attention. This includes experiment-




public agricultural credit agencies, cooperatives, pressure 
on commercial banks to extend their services in rural areas, 
loans to informal groups of farmers, and tying of credit to 
area development programs are part of building this finan-
cial infrastructure. Loan repayment problems, weak finan-
cial institutions, lack of medium and long-term credit, re-
sistance by commercial banks to agricultural lending in 
general and to small farmers in particular, and political 
intervention in rural financial markets are typical problems 
that emerge in countries like Ethiopia. It is also common 
that providing loans to small farmers is more expensive than 
anticipated. The willingness of foreign aid agencies or 
local governments to sustain the subsidies needed to main-
tain financially viable formal lenders tends to weaken as 
the costs of the program become visible. 
A number of countries also experience the same type of 
problems faced in Jamaica: e.g. Turkey, Guyana, Peru and 
Bangladesh. In these countries the financial infrastructure 
is reasonably well developed, but 'the level of real economic 
activity and economic stability in the country is such that 
it is very difficult to maintain a healthy and viable finan-
cial system. Countries like Jamaica that are experiencing 
negative real ~conomic growth rates present special problems 
for those interes4ed in rural finance. If farmers find that 
their product prices are relatively low, that many of the 
modern inputs they need are in short supply, that marketing 
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conditions are chaotic, and that little or no new agricul-
tural technology is available to them, they will realize 
low returns to loan use in agriculture. This leads to a 
slack in loan demand and/or severe loan repayment problems. 
This in turn ties up a good deal of the lender's manager-
ial time and causes staff morale problems. Political in-
terventions are common in this environment as the govern-
ment tries to expand the supply of loans as a means of 
overcoming deficiencies in real economic activities. 
The Jamaican case is a vivid reminder that increasing 
the amount of concessionary priced loans is not a substitute 
for economic policies that result in high yields or product 
prices at the farm level. The Jamaican case also illus-
trates the problems of maintaining strong financial institu-
tions that have capable staffs, collect most of their loans, 
have operations that cover their costs, develop a loan port-
folio that matches the term structure of its sources of 
funds, and is also able to maintain some independence from 
political interference. 
Financial Intermediaries 
Nine of the conference papers discussed various problems 
of financial intermediaries providing financial services in 
rural areas [Von Pischke, Wilson, D'Mello, Youngjohns, 
Roberts, Harriss, Howell and Bottrall, Verghagen, and Dridi]. 
One of the things that dawned on me during the discussion 
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of these papers was that many people still feel that there 
is some unique financial institution that can and will pro-
vide adequate financial services in rural areas. The quest 
for this unique institution is eternal. Those interested 
in cooperatives often argue that they are the proper ve-
hicle to provide financial services in rural areas. Others 
argue that only government agencies, be they development 
banks, commercial banks, specialized small farmer develop-
ment programs with credit included, or supervised credit 
agencies can provide the proper services. In most of 
these discussions the role of the informal lender is ignored, 
or it is assumed that informal lenders do not provide legi-
~ timate service, and that they should be driven from the 
rural scene by expanding formal financial services. 
For some time I have thought that this emphasis on find-
ing the unique financial institution placed the emphasis in 
the wrong place. Despite a good deal of confusion about 
the subject, financial intermediation is a simple process 
that involves an intermediary taking claims on real resources 
from one individual or institution and lending these claims 
to some individual or agency that has too few resources for 
available opportunities. This transfer of contracts that 
represent claims on real resources can be done in a variety 
of ways. The critical aspect of this transfer is not the 
institutional form of the intermediary, whether the inter-
~ mediary is formal or informal, or whether it is privately 
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owned or state owned. Rather, the vital issue is the cost 
of financial intermediation, the dependability and stability 
of the lender, and whether the intermediary is providing 
the appropriate range of financial service to the people 
who need them. I feel that more emphasis ought to be 
placed on improving the process of financial intermediation, 
and that any type of intermediary that can provide the 
range of services needed should be supported and encouraged. 
This is not to say that developing appropriate financial 
institutions in rural areas should be ignored. My feeling 
is that more time ought to be spent on determining why exist-
ing institutions, be they formal or informal, are not provid-
r 
ing the kinds of financial services that are necessary to ~ 
meet development ~bjectives. Without this type of diagnosis, 
new institutions ~oon begin to perform like old institutions. 
The papers by Von Pischke and Dridi illustrated a number 
of the problems that financial institutions trying to spec-
ialize in agricultural loans encounter. They both illustrated 
how high costs of serving agriculture in general, and the 
small farmer in particular, can undermine the financial inte-
grity of the lending institution. This leads to political 
dependence on the part of the lending institution as it 
continually returns to the government or some outside aid 
agency for resources to maintain or expand its loanable 
funds and cover its operating cost. Delays in extending 




loan decision-making become common fare in these types of 
specialized agricultural credit agencies, when their inter-
est charges and loan repayment are not sufficient to sus-
tain the real value of the loan portfolio, or to cover the 
real cost of carrying out the financial intermediation. 
The papers by Wilson and D'Mello reviewed some of the 
problems faced by commercial banks as they try, or are 
forced, to add more agricultural loans to their portfolio. 
These commercial banks face many of the same problems en-
countered by the specialized banks. They have some advan-
tages, however. One is' that they are able to depend more 
on deposits for loanable funds than is typical of special~ 
ized agricultural banks. This allows them to be a bit more 
independent, even if they are part of a nationalized banking 
system such as exists in India. They also generally have 
a large part of their loans extended to other sectors of 
the economy where the rates of return on loans are higher 
than they are on agricultural loans, where the loan transac-
tion costs are generally lower than they are for agricul-
' tural loans, and where collateral is more sa~isfactory to 
the bank than is true on agricultural loans. These banks 
may be forced to lend to agriculture at concessionary rat~s, 
and end up loosing money on these operations, but these 
losses do not threaten the long-run viability of the bank 
as is the case for many of the specialized agricultural banks. 
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Several of the papers in the Conference reviewed some 
of the common techniques used by the monetary authorities 
to force commercial banks to lend more money for agricul-
tural purposes. These techniques include loan quotas, loan 
guarantee programs, special rediscount facilities at central 
banks, forcing the banks to open more branches in rural 
areas, and raw political pressure. It is typically very 
difficult to evaluate the results of these techniques. 
Money and loans are fungible and divisible. It is very 
easy for the lenders (as well as borrowers) to appear to 
be responding positively to the policy intent behind these 
techniques, but end up making very little change in the way 
they do business, if it is not in their interest to change 
in the desired directions. They may, for example, give 
multiple small loans to a wealthy borrower. Very extensive 
data on all sources and uses of liquidity are needed to 
effectively evaluate the results of credit control techniques. 
Youngjohns' paper showed that cooperatives encounter 
many of the same problems as specialized or commercial 
banks when they try to provide financial services in rural 
areas. He stressed something that is often forgotten about 
cooperatives; they are a business. Too many people blame 
the collapse of a cooperative on corrupt management or the 
lack of understanding of cooperative principles by manage-
ment and members. Too few people explain cooperative fail-
ures on the basis of business failure. Cooperatives often 
. " ' 
• 
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fail because they cannot generate enough revenue to cover 
their costs of operation, and/or their services are so poor 
that few members want to do business with them. When 
policymakers try to use cooperatives as conduits for chan-
nelling cheap credit into rural areas, the local elites 
often capture control of the cooperative to monopolize the 
"sweet money" given out by the government. Since it is 
government money it is little wonder that the local elite, 
who make the loans to themselves, feel little pressure 
to repay the loans. It is also little wonder that a large 
number of the less fortunate farmers who are excluded from 
getting the cheap loans and enjoying the fruits of unpunished 
default become disaffected with doing business with the 
cooperative. 
Several additional papers in the conference covered 
problems of improving the quality of the services provided 
by credit agencies and how to reduce their costs. Verhagen 
covered the general principles of forming groups. A number 
of countries are experimenting with group loans as a way 
of reducing the costs of serving small farmers. To date, 
the results of these group loans appears to· be mixed. 
Some programs are working well while others are not. One 
of the problems associated with group lending is repayment. 
Many of the group loans are made on the basis of joint lia-
bility. It appears that when groups are formed solely for 
the purpose of getting access to loans, that the joint 
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liability is not very effective in inducing repayment. If 
one member does not repay, the other members may decide not 
to repay. On the other hand, when a group is joined in 
order to realize other group "goods" beyond loans, it appears 
that the groups tend to hang together better. 
Howell and Bottrall discussed some of the other ser-
vices that might be provided along with credit. This discus-
sion opened up the vital topic of the kinds of changes in 
real economic activities that must be made in order to 
create an environment in which additional financial inter-
mediation is useful. Farmers will not borrow and repay loans 
if they cannot get a decent price most of the time for their 
products, if modern inputs are not generally available at 
reasonable prices, and if they cannot expect to get a decent 
yield from their farm enterprises under usual conditions. 
They forcefully pointed out that it may be necessary to de-
velop administrative capacity to carry out a number of de-
velopment activities before or along with loans to ensure 
success of the credit activities. Roberts complemented 
their discussion by pointing out that many credit agencies 
need to do staff training in order for the agency to handle 
the difficult tasks of lending to agriculture and also co-
ordinate lending activities with other development efforts. 
He went on to argue that many of these agencies need to 
develop some internal evaluation capacity that can provide 
• 
• u ' 
• 
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management with information needed for timely decision-
making. 
On a number of occasions during the Conference, com-
ments were made about informal lenders. Only one of the 
papers, by Harriss, focused entirely on that topic, however. ~ 
She pointed out something that is often overlooked in dis-
cussions about informal lenders. That is, that their lend-
ing activities, especially in low income areas are often 
tied up with a number of other marketing activities: pro-
duct sales, input sales, exchange of labor, and information 
services. She argued that it is difficult to understand 
informal credit transactions unless one also understands 
the other closely related marketing activities. Overall, 
she also argued that the informal lenders, at least in 
Southern India, were generally providing valuable services 
that were not available from the formal financial system. 
Some follow-up discussion in the Conference focused on how 
formal lenders could learn how to improve the quality of 
their financial services by having a clearer understanding 
of what informal lenders were doing. The speed with which 
informal lenders make most loans is a case in point. 
Farm Household Problems 
Four additional papers in the Conference focused on 
finance problems at the farm-household level. Papers by 
David and Meyer and another by Lipton outlined the problems 
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encountered when one tries to evaluate the impact of credit 
use at the farm-household level. Both papers stressed the 
complexities of engaging in this type of analysis. They 
stressed that liquidity uses in both the farm enterprises 
as well as the household must be analyzed together, and 
that all sources of liquidity, not just formal loans, must 
be looked at to get a complete picture of the impact of 
credit use. Again, the essential property of finance, fungi-
bility, was fingered as the major contributor to the diffi-
culties of analyzing what borrowers do with their loans. 
Without very detailed information that is very costly to 
collect, it is virtually impossible to directly link credit 
use with various types of economic changes. 
Two additional papers reported on credit use activities 
at the farm level in Nigeria and Upper Volta. The paper by 
Stickley and Tapsoba discussed various measures of loan de-
linquency and also presented some of the main reasons for 
loan repayment problems at the borrower level in Upper Volta. 
They pointed out that shortcomings on the part of the lender 
were an important factor that caused default. Osuntogun's 
paper reported on farm level data collected in Nigeria on 
credit sources and uses. It stressed the need to collect 
this type of information so that policymakers could make 
more intelligent decisions about rural financial service 
needs. He pointed out that many borrowers used agricultural 





to develop credit programs and policies without this type of 
information. 
Concluding Comments 
Some of the participants in the Conference along with a 
number of other people who are interested in the operations 
of rural financial markets in low income countries are very 
concerned about the way these markets are functioning. In 
all too many countries these markets are doing little to 
encourage savings and capital formation. They are badly 
fragmented and doing a poor job of helping the economy to 
allocate real resources efficiently and equitably. Because 
of the widespread use of concessionary interest rates and 
the presense of ample inflation, these markets are also trans-
ferring very large income subsidies to those who receive 
negatively priced loans. High loan default rates, the lack 
of economies of scale in lending, and generally high loan 
transaction costs are all helping to undermine the financial 
integrity of many formal financial institutions. In my opinion, 
some significant and rather dramatic changes must be made in 
~he way rural financial markets are used in the development 
process. This will include a number of changes in policies. 
We have to understand more clearly why financial markets fail 
to work in a socially desirable manner and to clearly identify 
the changes that are necessary for these markets to operate 
as they should . 
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The papers and discussion presented at the Conference 
led me to think that too much emphasis has been placed on 
the demand side of credit, and that too little emphasis 
has been placed on the supply side. Further, that too 
little attention has been given to using rural financial 
markets to mobilize voluntary savings. Further, credit 
has too often been viewed as an input in the production 
process and not as part of the financial intermediation pro-
cess. Far too much attention has been directed at providing 
cheap credit to farmers and not enough attention paid to 
what low interest rates do to savers, the performance of 
financial institutions, efficient resource allocation, and 
income distribution. I also feel that more attention ought 
to be paid to how financial markets are used to satisfy po-
litical ends. It may be that we would understand a good 
bit more about how financial markets currently function if 
we analyzed whether cheap credit and toleration of loan de-
faults are part of a political patronage system. 
During a reception before the Conference one of the 
Conference participants commented that he thought there was 
relatively little exciting to do in the way of analyzing 
rural financial markets. After listening to intense debate 
about the issues summarized above for three days and parts 
of several nights he was gracious enough to confess to me, 
at the end of the Conference, that he had changed his mind. 
He found a number of new and challenging topics raised in 
the Conference. I hope other readers of this vo~ur~e will 
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